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Summary 
About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, 
including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 
million land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of 
entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on criminal warrants.  
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 
(CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at 
America’s 329 POEs. CBP’s primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to 
confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. 
Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful 
travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for 
Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. 
In general, DHS and CBP rely on “risk management” to strike this balance. One part of the risk 
management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the immigration process, 
beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and other departments involved in the 
inspections process use a number of screening tools to distinguish between known, low-risk 
travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited 
admissions processing, while higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive 
secondary inspections. 
As part of its dual mission and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration 
system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. 
Congress required DHS’ predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the 
implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. The 
current system collects and stores biographic entry data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) 
from almost all non-citizens entering the United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., 
fingerprints and digital photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a 
subset of land travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit 
data, the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers and 
with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain non-citizens 
exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not collect data from persons 
exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect any biometric exit data. Questions also 
have been raised about DHS’ ability to use existing entry-exit data to identify and apprehend visa 
overstayers. 
The inspections process and entry-exit system continued to be perennial issues for Congress and a 
number of questions persist, including in the context of the ongoing debate about immigration 
reform and in the context of screening for infectious diseases at POEs due to heightened concerns 
about the health screening of people arriving in the United States from the Ebola infected areas in 
West Africa. What is the scope of illegal migration through ports of entry, and how can Congress 
and DHS minimize illegal flows without unduly slowing legal travel? The 113th Congress 
considered steps to enhance POE personnel and infrastructure, primarily through the 
appropriations process. The 113th Congress passed legislation that required the completion of the 
entry-exit system, a program that has been the subject of ongoing legislative activity since 1996, 
as summarized in the Appendix to this report.  
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Introduction 
About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, 
including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 
million incoming land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at 
ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on outstanding criminal 
warrants.1  
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 
(CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at 
America’s 329 POEs. About 21,464 CBP officers inspect travelers, agricultural products, and 
cargo at U.S. ports and abroad.2 Most foreign nationals visiting the United States also are subject 
to some form of screening prior to their arrival at a POE, including when they apply for a 
nonimmigrant visa or to enter through the Visa Waiver Program,3 and through CBP’s screening of 
information provided by air and sea carriers. 
CBP’s primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are 
eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens.4 This mission is challenging 
because of the scope and complexity of immigration inflows: millions of travelers at hundreds of 
ports must be individually screened against dozens of rules governing who may or may not enter 
the country. Moreover, strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate 
the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A 
fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. The 
answer to this question varies across diverse geographic regions, different modes of travel, and in 
response to a constantly shifting landscape of potential threats and legal immigration flows. 
As part of this dual mission, and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. 
immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at 
POEs. Congress required DHS’ predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996,5 
but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal.  
This report reviews the legislative history of immigration inspections requirements and the entry-
exit system. The report then describes the implementation of these provisions, including pre-
travel screening, primary and secondary inspections, trusted traveler programs, outbound 
                                                 
1 Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations based on data provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) Office of Legislative Affairs, December 30, 2013.  
2 Most CBP officers are based in the United States; some conduct immigration and cargo inspections abroad through 
partnership agreements with other countries. See in this report “Preclearance”; also see CRS Report R43014, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security. 
3 The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows nationals from certain countries to enter the United States as temporary 
visitors for business or pleasure without obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad; see in this report “Visa Waiver 
Program.” 
4 “Aliens” is synonymous with non-citizens, including legal permanent residents, temporary nonimmigrants, and 
unauthorized aliens. Inadmissible aliens are aliens who are not permitted to enter the United States. Aliens may also be 
referred to as “foreign nationals.” 
5 Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, 
Div. C) , as amended; see in this report “Entry-Exit System: Legislative Requirements.” 
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enforcement, and the entry-exit system. The final section of the report identifies a number of 
issues for Congress related to immigration admissions and enforcement at POEs. 
Immigration Inspections: Policy Goals 
Controlling admissions is a core element of state sovereignty; but such control entails the 
opposing goals of: 1) preventing unlawful entries, while 2) facilitating legal flows. These policy 
goals are inherently in tension, as efforts to identify and interdict illegal entrants inevitably 
challenges, and may delay, the smooth flow of legitimate travelers.6 
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress has absolute authority to control immigration by 
establishing rules for the admission, exclusion, and deportation of non-citizens.7 Some of the first 
federal laws, the so-called Aliens and Seditions Acts of 1798, authorized the president to arrest 
and/or deport any alien who represented a danger to the United States.8 And while Congress 
during most of the 19th century generally favored open admissions to the sparsely populated 
country, a series of laws beginning in 1875 excluded several classes of aliens, including criminals 
and prostitutes,9 aliens from certain countries and regions,10 anarchists,11 communists,12 and aliens 
engaged in espionage,13 among others. 
Thus, while the specific issues in U.S. immigration law have evolved over time, a core policy 
goal has always been to prevent the entry of aliens who threaten U.S. interests. For the last several 
decades, these threats, or enforcement priorities, have fallen within three broad categories:14 
• Unauthorized immigration. Since 1980, the estimated unauthorized population 
in the United States has increased from about 2.5 million to about 11.7 million 
people.15 Between one-third and one-half of these aliens are believed to have 
                                                 
6 A similar tension exists with respect to cargo imports, which are beyond the scope of this report. See CRS Report 
R43014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security. 
7 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623. For a fuller discussion, see Thomas Alexander 
Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Mormura, et al., Immigrtaion and Citizenship: Process and Policy (St. Paul, 
MN: West Law, 2012), pp. 191-192. 
8 Aliens Act of July 6, 1798 (1 Stat. 566). 
9 Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 477). Provisions to exclude certain criminals, including aliens convicted of “crimes of 
moral turpitude” remain on the books under INA §212(a)(2). See CRS Report R41104, Immigration Visa Issuances and 
Grounds for Exclusion: Policy and Trends. 
10 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (22 Stat. 58) suspended immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States for 
10 years; subsequent legislation made the ban permanent and eventually expanded it to the entire “Asia-Pacific 
triangle” (Immigration Act of 1917; 39 Stat. 874). The Quota Law of 1921 (42 Stat. 5) and the Immigration Act of 
1924 (43 Stat. 153) established the “national origins quota system,” which eventually set annual immigration quotas for 
the Eastern Hemisphere to match the ethnic demographics of the U.S. census of 1920. 
11 Immigration Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 1213). 
12 Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 464). 
13 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 (P.L. 82-414; 66 Stat. 163). 
14 For a fuller discussion of threats at U.S. borders see CRS Report R42969, Border Security: Understanding Threats at 
U.S. Borders. 
15 CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen 
Wasem, Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed, Pew Research Center, 
Washington, DC, September 23, 2013. 
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entered lawfully through a POE and over-stayed their visas.16 An unknown 
proportion of illegal entrants also passed through POEs, either concealed in a 
vehicle or by using fraudulent documents. One enforcement priority at POEs, 
therefore, is to prevent these unlawful entries. 
• Transnational crime. CBP officers performing immigration inspections are the 
primary line of defense against certain illegal flows, including in particular most 
illegal drug flows other than marijuana.17 Immigration inspectors also seek to 
arrest known smugglers and other criminals at POEs. 
• International terrorism. National security concerns have loomed large in 
immigration policy in the years since the 2001 Al Qaeda attacks against the 
United States (the 9/11 attacks). All 19 of the 9/11 hijackers entered the United 
States legally through POEs, and constraining terrorist travel is now recognized 
as a critical defense against terrorist attacks within the United States.18  
Yet while most people would agree that terrorists, criminals, and immigration violators are 
appropriate enforcement targets, no consensus exists about how to prioritize these threats because 
the likelihood of each type of illegal entry is unknown, and because the potential consequences of 
these threats are subjective and difficult to measure. The likelihood of each of these threats 
occurring also varies by geography and mode of entry. For example, certain types of illegal 
migrants may be more likely to travel by bus or car across the southern border, smugglers may 
favor other distribution routes, and terrorists may be likely to reach the United States by air 
and/or at northern border POEs. Threat actors also may seek to counter enforcement efforts by 
adapting their behavior to avoid such patterns.19 
Enforcement must be balanced by a second overarching goal: the facilitation of legal flows. With 
international tourism directly accounting for over $200 billion in 2012 (almost 1% of U.S. gross 
domestic product),20 travel facilitation supports the U.S. economy. Smooth processing at POEs 
also streamlines travel for the tens of millions of U.S citizens returning from international trips 
each year, and may improve Americans’ experiences abroad through reciprocal arrangements. In 
addition, immigration agents at POEs define visitors’ first impressions of America and the U.S. 
government, and therefore play an important diplomatic role. 
Enforcement and travel facilitation are fundamentally in tension because efforts to identify and 
interdict unlawful travelers tend to impede the flow of the entire admissions queue, and efforts to 
expedite the line may increase the risk that an illicit traveler is overlooked. Thus, in addition to 
                                                 
16 CRS Report RS22446, Nonimmigrant Overstays: Brief Synthesis of the Issue. 
17 Most cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines smuggled into the United States enter through ports of entry in private, 
non-commercial vehicles (i.e., are admitted during immigration processing, rather than as cargo imports); most 
smuggled marijuana (along with certain other types of contraband) is hidden within legal commercial loads (i.e., enters 
through the customs process) or is smuggled between ports of entry. See U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug 
Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment: 2011, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 13.  
18 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report 
(Washington: GPO, 2004). Hereafter: 9/11 Commission Report. 
19 For a fuller discussion of threats at U.S. borders see CRS Report R42969, Border Security: Understanding Threats at 
U.S. Borders. 
20 World Bank, “International tourism, receipts,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.CD. This figure 
understates the full economic impact of international tourism since it does not account for certain non-travel and 
tourism goods purchased by international travelers. 
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questions about how to prioritize diverse threats, Congress and DHS must decide how to balance 
enforcement and the facilitation of legitimate travel. Is it better to admit one illegal actor, or to 
delay the admission of 1,000 lawful travelers? How should Congress and DHS weigh the benefits 
of more robust enforcement against the costs to commerce, privacy and civil liberties, and related 
concerns?  
In an effort to reduce border wait times without compromising border security, CBP’s response to 
these questions emphasizes “risk management.” In general, risk management refers to a process 
for assessing the risks associated with potential threats and calibrating the enforcement response 
to the estimated gravity of the threat.21 In the case of immigration inspections, risk management 
involves screening travelers at multiple points in the immigration process to distinguish between 
low- and high-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions 
processing through the Visa Waiver Program and/or trusted traveler programs, while higher-risk 
travelers may be subject to more extensive secondary inspections. Unauthorized migrants at 
POEs may be subject to expedited removal and other types of immigration enforcement (see “The 
Immigration Inspections Process”).  
Legislative History 
Inspections for Admission 
The procedures governing inspections of persons applying for admission are described in 8 C.F.R. 
Section 235, which derives its authority from Sections 101, 103, 215, 221, and 235 of the 
Immigration and National Act of 1952 (INA, P.L. 82-414), as amended. Under INA §215, in 
particular, both aliens and citizens are required to present appropriate entry documents, except as 
otherwise ordered by the president; and (pursuant to 8 C.F.R §235.1) to enter through designated 
ports of entry.22 INA §211 spells out additional documentary requirements for immigrant 
admissions. And INA §287 authorizes immigration officers, among other powers and pursuant to 
regulations, to interrogate any person believed to be an alien as to the person’s right to enter or 
remain in the United States, and to arrest any alien attempting to enter the United States 
unlawfully.23 
Prior to 2002, INA §103 made the Attorney General responsible for controlling U.S. borders and 
enforcing these laws. Pursuant to §§401- 403 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA, P.L. 
107-296), these responsibilities were transferred to DHS.24 The INA also authorizes the consular 
                                                 
21 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R42969, Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders. 
22 Pursuant to INA §235A, added by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, Div. C), preinspection stations are maintained at certain foreign airports, including airports 
identified as top points of departure for inadmissible aliens arriving at U.S. POEs. The United States implemented 
preinspection services at certain Canadian airports beginning in 1952; for a fuller discussion of preinspection services 
see, in this report, “Preclearance.” 
23 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §235.1(b), a person claiming U.S. citizenship must establish that fact to the satisfaction of the 
inspecting officer, including by presenting a U.S. passport or other acceptable document; and a person who fails to 
meet these requirements is presumed for purposes of inspection for admission to be an alien. 
24 Sections 401-403 of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) also transferred to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) the duties of the U.S. Customs Service, and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) within CBP also is 
responsible for cargo inspections at ports of entry (POE). For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43014, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security. 
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processing system as part of the visa issuance process, giving State Department consular officers 
sole authority to issue visas to aliens seeking admission to the United States.25 Section 428 of the 
HSA charged DHS with issuing regulations on visa issuances and authorized DHS personnel 
abroad to advise consular officers and to review and investigate visa applications; but the HSA 
left the State Department in charge of actual visa issuance (also see “Consular Reviews”).26 
Historically, U.S. citizens and most citizens of Canada and Bermuda entering the United States by 
land or sea from the Western Hemisphere were exempted from certain document requirements.27 
Following the 9/11 attacks, based on a recommendation by the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission),28 Section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA, P.L. 108-458) directed DHS, in consultation with 
the Department of State (DOS), to develop a plan to require a passport or other secure 
document(s) for all travel into the United States by U.S. citizens and others. The resulting plan, 
known as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, requires adult land and sea travelers entering 
the United States from within the hemisphere to present a passport or other secure document.29 
Entry-Exit System: Legislative Requirements  
Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, Div. C) required the Attorney General, within two years of enactment 
(i.e., by September 30, 1998), to develop an automated entry and exit control system that would 
collect records of alien arrivals and departures and allow the Attorney General through online 
searches to match such arrivals and departures and thereby identify nonimmigrant aliens who 
remain in the United States beyond the periods of their visas (i.e., visa overstayers). The bill also 
required the Attorney General to annually report to Congress on the number of visa overstayers 
and their countries of origin. 
Congress has amended the system’s requirements and deadlines on several occasions since then, 
including by adding an entry-exit requirement to legislation authorizing the Visa Waiver Program 
and by requiring the entry-exit system to include biometric technology and to be fully 
interoperable with DOS and Department of Justice (DOJ) databases. See the Appendix for a full 
list of entry-exit legislation. Despite Congress’s ongoing attention, however, the entry-exit system 
remains incompletely implemented (see “Entry-Exit System: Implementation”).  
                                                 
25 INA §221, as amended; for a fuller discussion see CRS Report R41093, Visa Security Policy: Roles of the 
Departments of State and Homeland Security. 
26 Ibid. 
27 For a fuller discussion, see Department of Homeland Security, “Documents Required for Travelers Departing from 
or Arriving in the United States at Sea and Land Ports-of-Entry from within the Western Hemisphere,” 73 Federal 
Register 18384, April 3, 2008. 
28 9/11 Commission Report. 
29 Acceptable documents include U.S. passport cards, enhanced driver’s licenses, trusted traveler cards, U.S. military 
identification card, U.S. Merchant Mariner document, and enhanced tribal documents. See see CBP, “Document 
Requirements for Land and Sea Travel.”  
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Travel Facilitation 
With the increased focus after 9/11 on national security during immigration screening, Congress 
has taken steps to ensure that DHS also focuses on travel facilitation. Section 302(b)(1) of the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001 (EBSVERA, P.L. 107-173), for 
example, directed the departments to “utilize technologies that facilitate the lawful and efficient 
cross-border movement of commerce and persons without compromising the safety and security 
of the United States.” In addition, §7209(k) of the IRTPA described congressional findings that 
“expediting the travel of previously screened and known travelers across the borders of the 
United States should be a high priority,” including because it “can permit inspectors to better 
focus on terrorists attempting to enter the United States.” The section directs DHS to develop and 
implement a registered traveler program for this purpose (see “Trusted Traveler Programs”). 
IRTPA §7210 also amended INA §235A to require DHS to add 25 preinspection stations (up from 
5 required under IIRIRA) and to locate such stations at locations that “would most effectively 
facilitate the travel of admissible aliens” in addition to reducing the arrival of inadmissible aliens, 
as in the original language (see “Preclearance”).  
The Immigration Inspections Process 
Travelers seeking to enter the United States go through one to three steps in the immigration 
inspection process. In the first step, prior to travel, most travelers who are not U.S. citizens or 
legal permanent residents (LPRs)30 must apply for permission to enter the United States, by 
obtaining a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad or through the Visa Waiver Program. Air travelers are 
subject to additional screening prior to arrival (see “Pre-Travel Screening”). Second, all arriving 
travelers are subject to inspection (or preclearance) by a CBP officer prior to entering the United 
States (see “Primary Inspections”). Third, some passengers also may be selected through risk-
based screening or at random for more intensive scrutiny (see “Secondary Inspections and 
Immigration Enforcement”). Participants in CBP’s trusted traveler programs volunteer for 
additional screening in advance and thereby become eligible for expedited processing at POEs 
(see “Trusted Traveler Programs”).  
Pre-travel Screening 
Most foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States must get permission to do so prior to 
travel, and are subject to pre-travel screening. With the exception of U.S. LPRs,31 certain 
Canadian citizens,32 and certain residents of Caribbean islands other than Cuba,33 foreign 
                                                 
30 Legal permanent residents (LPRs) are foreign nationals who come to live lawfully and permanently in the United 
States; see CRS Report R42866, Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview. 
31 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §211, LPRs seeking admission to the United States generally must present a valid, unexpired 
immigrant visa, permanent resident card (“green card”), or other proof of identity and permanent resident status. 
32 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §212.1, Canadian citizens generally are not required to obtain a visa to enter the United States 
except under certain circumstances. Certain Canadian citizens also may apply to enter the United States as NAFTA 
Professionals (with TN nonimmigrant status) at a U.S. port of entry. 
33 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §212.1, citizens of the British overseas territory of Bermuda are not required to obtain a visa to 
enter the United States except under certain circumstances; residents of other Caribbean islands may be exempted from 
visa requirements under certain, more narrow conditions. 
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nationals seeking admission to the United States must apply in advance for a nonimmigrant visa34 
at a U.S. consulate abroad (see “Consular Reviews”), or in certain cases through an on-line 
process for permission to participate in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (see “Visa Waiver 
Program”). Air passengers are subject to further screening at several points during the lead-up to 
their U.S.-bound flights (see “Air Passenger Screening”). 
Consular Reviews35 
Before applying for admission at a U.S. port of entry, aliens seeking to visit the United States 
generally must obtain a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad. Visa applicants are required to submit 
biographic and biometric data, and usually must participate in an in-person interview. Applicants 
also may be subject to physical and mental examinations. Consular reviews are designed to 
ensure that aliens do not receive a visa to visit the United States if they are inadmissible for any 
of the reasons identified in INA §212, including health-related grounds, criminal history, security 
and terrorist concerns, indigence (likely to become a public charge), seeking to work without 
proper labor certification, ineligibility for citizenship, and certain previous immigration 
violations. 
As part of the visa application process, DOS consular officers use the Consular Consolidated 
Database (CCD) to screen visa applicants. The CCD is a database of over 100 million visa and 
passport case records and 75 million photographs from 25 different DOS systems.36 The CCD 
links automatically to the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which 
consular officers use to identify visa applicants on security watchlists or with other derogatory 
information, and to the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) and the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which CBP officers use to screen arriving travelers at 
POEs (see “Text Box: Select Immigration Inspections Databases and Systems”). Consular 
officers refer high risk cases to DHS and other law enforcement agencies for Security Advisory 
Opinions (SAOs).  
At certain consulates, the review process is further supplemented by the DHS Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa Security Program (VSP). Under this program, special agents at 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) headquarters and in 20 high-risk consulates 
work with consular officers to examine visa applications for fraud, initiate investigations, 
coordinate with local law enforcement partners, and provide training and advice. The VSP 
Security Advisory Opinion Unit works with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
provide a coordinated response when consular officers seek an SAO about a high risk case.37 
                                                 
34 Aliens seeking to come to the United States temporarily are known as nonimmigrants. These aliens are admitted to 
the United States for a temporary period of time and an expressed reason. For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report 
RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions. 
35 Except as otherwise noted, this section is based on CRS Report R41093, Visa Security Policy: Roles of the 
Departments of State and Homeland Security; see that report for a fuller discussion. Also see CRS Report R41104, 
Immigration Visa Issuances and Grounds for Exclusion: Policy and Trends. 
36 Department of State Privacy Coordinator, “Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA),” March 22, 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93772.pdf. 
37 Ibid. Also see Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Congressional Budget Justification: FY2014, pp. 36-
37. 
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Select Immigration Inspections Databases and Systems 
 
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS): CBP database containing information about inbound air 
passengers and crew members. Air carriers submit passenger information to APIS prior to departing on U.S.-bound 
flights (or prior to arrival in the United States, in certain cases), and CBP uses the data to identify high-risk and 
inadmissible passengers. 
Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS): DHS database that collects and maintains biographic 
arrival and departure information on non-U.S. citizens traveling in and out of the United States. ADIS is maintained by 
CBP and the DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), and is the main database used by ICE to identify 
suspected visa overstayers. 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT): DHS’s primary biometric database. Certain aliens’ 
biometric records are added to IDENT upon admission to the United States, when aliens are apprehended or 
arrested by a DHS agency, and when aliens apply for certain immigration benefits.  
Automated Targeting System (ATS): CBP database of incoming and certain outbound cargo and persons. 
Advanced screening information is added to the ATS and checked against intelligence data from CBP’s National 
Targeting Center (NTC) and other intelligence and law enforcement databases to produce a risk-based score. 
Travelers above a certain ATS threshold generally are selected for secondary inspection. 
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS): DOS database used by passport agencies, posts, and border 
inspection agencies to perform name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify subjects of terrorist lookouts 
and watchlists and other individuals who are ineligible for a visa or require other special action.  
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA): Web-based CBP system that screens applicants to enter 
the United States through the Visa Waiver Program against terrorist, national security, and criminal watchlists.  
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS): Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
criminal database of fingerprints, criminal histories, photographs, and biographic information. Biographic and biometric 
records may be checked against IAFIS to verify that aliens have not been convicted of crimes making them 
inadmissible to the United States. 
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS): DHS database of shared law enforcement files related to 
individuals, businesses, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels with suspected criminal violations. IBIS is used by CBP officers at 
POEs, U.S. Citizens and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers making determinations about immigration benefits, and 
other U.S. and international law enforcement agencies involved with border enforcement. 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC): FBI database for tracking federal, state, local, and tribal crime data. 
NCIC includes records of stolen vehicles and other articles, foreign fugitives, missing persons, gang members, known 
or suspected terrorists, and persons with outstanding criminal warrants, among other data. 
National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P): CBP, other DHS, and DOS officials at the NTC-P use the 
Automated Targeting System to screen passenger manifests and visa records against the Terrorist Screening Database 
and other national security records in order to prevent certain travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. 
TECS (not an acronym): The principal information-sharing system used by CBP officers at ports of entry to screen 
arriving travelers for admissibility to the United States. CBP officers use TECS to check travelers against law 
enforcement and national security watchlists and to record and report on primary and secondary inspection results. 
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE): Classified database of known or suspected terrorists 
maintained by U.S. intelligence community. Data from TIDE are uses to populate the FBI’s Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB).  
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB): Also known as the consolidated Terrorist Watchlist, the TSBD is 
maintained by the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, and includes biometric and biographic records of known and 
suspected domestic and international terrorists. 
Source: CRS analysis of Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Defense Privacy Impact Assessments 
and related documents.  
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Visa Waiver Program 
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows nationals from certain countries38 to enter the United 
States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without obtaining a visa from a U.S. 
consulate abroad. Thus, the program is designed to facilitate travel and tourism from low-risk 
countries, while also fostering positive relations with such countries, and holding down consular 
operating costs. In FY2013, there were over 19 million visitors who entered the United States 
under the VWP program, constituting 40% of overseas visitors.39 
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns that the VWP may weaken security because 
travelers are not required to provide biometric data when applying for admission through the 
program and are exempted from consular reviews. In addition, some people see the program as 
vulnerable to visa overstays since the entry-exit system has not been fully implemented (see 
“Entry-Exit System: Implementation”).40  
On the other hand, aliens seeking admission under the VWP are required to submit biographic 
information and respond to eligibility questions through an on-line Electronic System for Travel 
Authorization (ESTA). Upon receipt of an ESTA application, CBP screens applicants’ data 
against TECS and the Automated Targeting System.41 And aliens authorized for travel under the 
VWP must provide biometric data during primary inspection at a POE prior to entering the 
United States.42 The program also may enhance U.S. security because partner countries must meet 
specified document security and information-sharing requirements, and it benefits U.S. visitors to 
VWP countries because they receive reciprocal visa-free travel benefits. 
Air Passenger Screening 
CBP conducts additional pre-travel screening of all persons (including U.S. citizens) seeking to 
travel to the United States by air.43 Upon a traveler’s purchase of an airline ticket, commercial 
airlines are required to make Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems and data available to CBP 
up to 72 hours in advance of travel. When passengers check in for international flights to the 
                                                 
38 The list of participating countries as of September 2013 includes Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. For a 
fuller discussion of the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program. 
39 DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: FY2013, Table 25. 
40 See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and 
Enforcement, Visa Waiver Program Oversight: Risks and Benefits of the Program, 112th Cong., 1st sess., December 7, 
2011. 
41 For a fuller discussion, also see DHS Privacy Office, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Electronic System for 
Travel Authorization (ESTA),” June 2, 2008. In the first 11 months of FY2012, CBP vetted over 10.7 million ESTA 
applications, and denied more than 21,000 (0.2%) of them; see Testimony of CBP Assistant Commissioner Kevin 
McAleenan, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 
Eleven Years Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., September 11, 2012 
(hereafter: McAleenan testimony, 2012). 
42 An alien found to be ineligible for VWP travel through ESTA still may apply for a visa before a U.S. consular 
officer. 
43 For a fuller discussion of CBP’s air passenger screening procedures, see McAleenan testimony, 2012. Also see CBP, 
“Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manfiests for Commercial Aircrafts and Vessels,” 
72 Federal Register 48320-48345, August 23, 2007. 
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United States, carriers are required to transmit passenger and crew manifests to CBP prior to 
securing aircraft doors before departure. Biographic traveler data (passport and travel itinerary 
information) is submitted to the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). 
Passenger PNR and APIS data (as well as visa and ESTA data) are forwarded to CBP’s National 
Targeting Center (NTC), where they are vetted against intelligence and law enforcement 
databases, including the consolidated terrorist watchlist and Interpol’s lost and stolen passport list. 
Data are matched against targeting rules through the ATS to identify risky travelers. The NTC 
may issue a no-board recommendation to air carriers, and/or flag travelers for a secondary 
inspection upon arrival at a U.S. POE. The NTC issued 3,181 no-board recommendations in 
FY2011; it issued 4,199 no-board recommendations in FY2012, and 5,378 no-board 
recommendations in FY2013.44 
Under the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) program, created in 2004, CBP officers also are 
posted at 11 international airports in 9 partner countries.45 IAP officers review documents, 
conduct interviews, and identify high-risk travelers. They do not have enforcement authority, but 
may recommend that air carriers not board certain passengers for U.S.-bound flights, flag 
passengers for secondary inspection upon arrival, and notify host-state law enforcement agencies 
of suspected criminal violations. Building upon the IAP concept, CBP launched the Joint Security 
Program (JSP) in 2009. Currently operational in Mexico City and Panama City, the JSP performs 
similar functions as the IAP, but also addresses travelers on international flights not bound to or 
from the United States. The IAP and JSP issued 2,890 no-board recommendations in FY2011, 
2,505 no-board recommendations in FY2012, and 3,501 no-board recommendations in FY2013.46 
As of November 22, 2013, the IAP and JSP had made a total of 19,998 no-board 
recommendations since the IAP’s inception in 2004.47 
Primary Inspections 
CBP officers at ports of entry interview arriving travelers and check their travel documents to 
determine whether the person is admissible to the United States. Basic biographic information 
(e.g., name, travel document number, date and location of arrival) for all travelers (including U.S. 
citizens) is collected and stored within TECS. 
Arriving travelers are subject to certain immigration, criminal, and national security background 
checks through the TECS system and the ATS, which identify certain travelers to be selected for 
secondary inspection. In general, these primary inspection activities have become far more 
intensive during the post-9/11 period. For example, whereas CBP historically examined drivers’ 
documents at land POEs but did not consistently examine passenger documents, since 2010 CBP 
has inspected documents for 100% of land travelers. And whereas only 5% of land travelers were 
subject to law enforcement database queries in FY2005, 97% of land travelers were subject to 
such queries in FY2013. Southern border inspection protocols have focused in particular on 
                                                 
44 McAleenan testimony, 2012; CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. No-board recommendations 
are not binding, but carriers generally accept them to avoid the penalties and costs associated with transporting 
improperly-documented travelers. 
45 Participating airports include Amsterdam, Doha, Frankfurt, London Heathrow and Gatwick, Madrid, Manchester, 
Mexico City, Panama City, Tokyo and Paris. 
46 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
47 Ibid. 
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evolving threats related to drug trafficking organizations, smugglers, and unauthorized 
immigrants.48 
Travelers are also validated against visa or visa waiver program records (for non-citizens) and 
against the APIS database (for all air travelers). Non-citizens arriving at air and sea ports are 
required to provide biometric data (fingerprints and digital photographs), which are added to the 
IDENT database and vetted against additional biometric databases (see “Text Box: Select 
Immigration Inspections Databases and Systems”). 
Travelers determined by the CBP officer to be admissible are allowed to enter the United States, 
though they may be subject to a separate customs and/or agricultural inspection. Travelers 
suspected for any reason of being inadmissible, including because of high ATS scores or 
derogatory information in the TECS system, are referred to secondary inspection for additional 
screening and/or a more thorough interview (see “Secondary Inspection”).  
Preclearance 
Travelers from 15 airports in Canada, Ireland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Aruba may be eligible 
to be pre-cleared by CBP officers based abroad. Preclearance (sometimes referred to as 
preinspection) includes the same document inspection, interview, and (as necessary) secondary 
inspection as normally occurs at a U.S. port of entry, including customs and agricultural 
screening. Preclearance officers at partner airports are unarmed and do not have law enforcement 
authority, but officers may refer people suspected of host-state criminal violations to partner 
country law enforcement agencies. Travelers arriving in the United States following a 
preclearance inspection may depart the aircraft directly into the arriving airport as they would 
from a domestic flight. 
CBP may initiate preclearance facilities at the request of a host government and pursuant to a 
formal agreement with such a government. Host governments are responsible for providing 
secure preclearance facilities, and CBP covers officer salaries (including certain overseas 
expenses). CBP views passenger preclearance programs as enhancing U.S. security and reducing 
deportation costs because such programs screen passengers earlier in the travel process, 
preventing the arrival of inadmissible travelers, as well as illegal weapons, agricultural products, 
etc., on U.S. soil.49 The programs also speed lawful travel by reducing congestion at U.S. airports, 
and they allow international travelers to take advantage of tighter U.S. connection times.  
In April 2013, DHS reached an agreement with the government of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) to set up a preclearance facility in the Abu Dhabi International Airport. Some Members of 
Congress have raised objections to the proposed Abu Dhabi program because no U.S. air carriers 
fly directly from Abu Dhabi to the United States, arguably giving the UAE-owned Etihad Airlines 
a competitive advantage over U.S.-owned carriers, and because UAE is not a signatory to the 
United Nations Refugee Convention.50 House appropriators included language in the House’s 
                                                 
48 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
49 CBP, “Fact Sheet: Preclearance Operations,” May 2013. 
50 See for example, Letter from Hon. Michael McCaul, Hon. Bennie Thompson, Hon. Bill Shuster, et al. to Janet 
Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, April 18, 2013; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, The Abu Dhabi Pre-Clearance Facility: Implications for 
U.S. Business and National Security, 113th Cong., 1st sess., July 10, 2013.  
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FY2014 DHS Appropriations report to limit funding for preclearance operations in new locations 
unless an economic impact analysis of the new location on U.S. air carriers has been conducted 
and provided to the committee, among other conditions.51  
I-94 Arrival/Departure Records  
Certain classes of nonimmigrants visiting the United States for a temporary period are issued an 
I-94 arrival/departure record upon admission.52 The I-94 record indicates the date of admission, 
class of admission (i.e., visa category), and visa expiration date. For travelers arriving at land 
ports, the I-94 consists of a paper form stapled to the foreign passport. Travelers are supposed to 
surrender the I-94 upon departure; and CBP may use I-94 receipts to track nonimmigrant exits 
and identify visa overstays. In practice, however, this system has proven difficult to implement, 
and paper I-94 receipts often are not collected from departing travelers. 
In 2013, CBP discontinued issuing paper I-94 forms for travelers arriving at air and sea ports. 
CBP now uses the APIS system and information collected by the State Department and by CBP 
officers at ports of entry to create electronic arrival/departure records for these travelers.53 In 
place of paper I-94 receipts for exiting air and sea travelers, CBP relies on carrier exit manifests 
(passenger lists) to confirm passenger departures (see “Entry-Exit System: Implementation”).  
Secondary Inspections and Immigration Enforcement  
Travelers who trigger an alarm in the ATS, who are the subject of certain derogatory information 
in TECS, or who arouse suspicion (through their behavior, responses to questions, or suspicious 
documents) during primary inspection may be referred for secondary inspection. A small sample 
of travelers at certain POEs also is randomly selected for secondary inspection (see “Random 
Compliance Examination (COMPEX) Program”). Travelers at land POEs who are required to 
obtain I-94 arrival/departure records (see “I-94 Arrival/Departure Records”) also are 
automatically referred to secondary inspection, where I-94s are issued. In general, travelers 
selected for secondary inspection may be subject to a more extensive interview and/or a physical 
search, as well as being subject to vetting against additional databases. At land POEs, travelers 
selected for secondary inspection (in contrast with other land travelers) must provide fingerprints 
data to be vetted against IDENT and other biometric databases (see “Text Box: Select 
Immigration Inspections Databases and Systems”).  
Inspection Outcomes 
Table 1 describes primary and secondary inspections by mode of entry for FY2005-FY2013. As 
Table 1 indicates, primary inspections at air and sea POEs fell slightly in FY2008 - FY2009, 
likely as a result of the global economic downturn, and inflows have increased since that time.  
                                                 
51 H.Rept. 113-91, p. 32. 
52 Nonimmigrants exempted from the I-94 requirement include Canadians admitted as visitors for business or pleasure 
and Mexicans with border crossing cards; see 8 C.F.R. §235.1(h). 
53 For a fuller discussion, see 78 Federal Register 18457. 
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Table 1. CBP Primary and Secondary Inspections, by Mode of Entry, FY2005-FY2013 
Fiscal Year Air POEs Sea POEs Land POEs 
 Primary Secondary Admissions Primary Secondary Admissions Primary Secondary Admissions 
2005 86,067,723 1,730,318 85,990,506 15,951,767 NA 15,949,121 317,765,243 37,948,279 317,593,950 
2006 87,844,145 2,035,959 87,796,222 15,958,508 NA 15,954,701 309,040,051 38,642,595 308,884,218 
2007 91,650,242  4,926,793 91,606,534 18,347,270 89,834 18,334,501 297,680,056 38,445,467 297,534,607 
2008 94,682,417  5,134,373 94,640,917 17,713,383 124,628 17,660,532 289,085,271 29,224,646 288,956,502 
2009 87,749,074  5,373,858 87,704,806 16,928,474 154,081 16,863,944 256,514,233 29,952,109 256,399,212 
2010 91,488,268  5,826,930 91,444,665 17,898,302 240,505 17,830,156 243,594,037 33,707,702 243,477,680 
2011 94,604,610  5,558,384 94,566,280 18,757,561 241,041 18,691,407 226,984,093 32,429,991 226,877,381 
2012 98,341,220 5,619,071 98,326,666 19,430,410 162,144 18,282,937 234,897,863 33,612,004 234,797,985 
2013 102,221,415 5,342,236 102,172,540 17,882,894 130,908 17,831,338 242,064,137 29,879,235 241,960,854 
Source: Data provided by CBP Office of Field Operations, December 30, 2013. 
Notes: Complete data for secondary inspections at seaports were not available for FY2005-FY2006. Airport secondary inspection data excludes pre-clearance airports 
(about 17% of air travelers) and private aircraft and crew (less than 1% of air travelers). 
 
Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry 
 
Congressional Research Service 14 
Overall, inspections at air POEs increased about 19% in FY2005-FY2013, from about 86 million 
to about 102 million. Inspections at land ports fell more sharply, dropping every year FY2005-
FY2011, before recovering slightly in FY2012-FY2013. At 242 million, land inspections in 
FY2013 were down 31% from the FY2005 total of 318 million. As a result of these trends, the 
total number of inspections fell from 420 million in FY2005 to 340 million in FY2011, before 
climbing back to 362 million in FY2013; and the proportion of all primary inspections occurring 
at land POEs fell from about 75% in FY2005 to about 67% in FY2013. 
As Table 1 also indicates, an increasing share of travelers was subject to secondary inspections 
during FY2005-FY2013. This trend exists across all three modes of entry, but was most 
pronounced at air POEs, where the proportion of travelers subject to secondary inspection 
increased from 2.0% in FY2005 to 6.4% in FY2010, before falling to 5.2% in FY2013 (5.3 
million out of 102 million).54 At sea POEs, the proportion of travelers subject to secondary 
inspection increased from 0.49% in FY2007 (the first year for which data are available) to a high 
of 1.3% in FY2010, to 0.7% in FY2013. And at land POEs, the proportion of travelers subject to 
secondary inspection increased from 11.9% in FY2005 to about 14% in FY2010-FY2012, before 
falling back to 12.3% in FY2013. At land ports, the increase in the secondary inspection rate has 
been a function of the fall in total travelers at such ports, not an increase in the number of 
secondary inspections. 
A final observation about Table 1 is that the great majority of travelers inspected at POEs are 
determined to be eligible for admission. Overall, the annual rate at which persons inspected at 
POEs were admitted to the United States remained steady at between 99.94% and 99.95% in 
FY2005-FY2013. (Put another way, about 5 out of 10,000 people arriving at a POE are denied 
admission.) Approval rates were similar across air, sea, and land modes of entry. 
Immigration Enforcement  
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 235.1, the burden of proof is on the traveler to demonstrate to a CBP officer 
at a POE that the traveler is a U.S. citizen or an admissible foreign national. In general, a person 
arriving at a POE who is determined to be ineligible for admission may be subject to similar 
sanctions as an unauthorized alien present in the United States, including four main outcomes: 
• Withdrawal of application: Pursuant to INA §235(a)(4), a CBP officer may 
permit an alien applying for admission to withdraw his or her application for 
admission and depart immediately from the United States. An alien withdrawing 
an application is not subject to additional penalties (i.e., a withdrawal does not 
result in a period of inadmissibility), but a record of the withdrawal is added to 
the alien’s file and may influence a future visa eligibility determination. 
• Standard removal: In general, an alien at a POE whom CBP determines to be 
inadmissible under INA §212 may be subject to removal from the United States 
under INA §240. Pursuant to INA §239, a CBP officer may initiate removal 
proceedings by serving an alien with written notice, known as a notice to appear 
(NTA). Pursuant to §240, an alien facing such removal proceedings generally 
may appear before an immigration judge and may be eligible to seek certain 
                                                 
54 Data on secondary inspections at air POEs excludes preclearance airports (see in this report, “Preclearance”), which 
accounts for about 17% of air travel to the United States. 
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types of discretionary relief from removal. An alien who is formally removed 
from the United States generally is ineligible for a visa (i.e., is inadmissible) for 
at least five years,55 and may be subject to criminal charges if he or she illegally 
reenters the United States.56 
• Expedited removal: Pursuant to INA §235(b), an alien arriving at a POE without 
documents or with fraudulent documents and who does not indicate a fear of 
persecution may be subject to “expedited removal” (ER). Under this provision, 
an alien may be formally removed by order of a CBP officer without appearing 
before an immigration judge and without being eligible for certain forms of 
relief. Aliens removed by ER are subject to the same penalties as aliens removed 
under INA §240. 
• Criminal arrest: CBP may arrest individuals (including U.S. citizens) at land, 
sea, and air POEs on the basis of an outstanding federal, state, local, or tribal 
criminal warrant; in response to a suspected violation of federal immigration-
related crimes; or in response to a suspected violation of other federal border-
related crimes, including smuggling crimes. 
Table 2 describes selected immigration enforcement outcomes at ports of entry for FY2005-
FY2013. As Table 2 indicates, there is no clear, sustained trend in three categories of interest: the 
overall number of aliens denied admission during this period has fluctuated between about 
253,000 aliens in FY2005 and about 195,000 aliens in FY2012; the number of aliens issued a 
notice to appear (i.e., placed in standard removal proceedings) has fluctuated between about 
15,000 aliens in FY2005 and about 24,000 aliens in FY2007 and FY2013 (consistently between 6 
and 12% of aliens denied admission);57 and the number of persons arrested on criminal charges or 
warrants has fluctuated between about 23,000 and 28,000. 
Table 2. Immigration Enforcement at Ports of Entry, Selected Outcomes 
FY2005-FY2013 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total 
Admitted 
Total 
Denied 
Admission 
Withdrawal of 
Application 
Notice to 
Appear 
Expedited 
Removal 
Criminal 
Arrests 
2005 419,533,577 253,041 96,081 15,371 55,546 23,214 
2006 412,635,141 209,437 93,022 22,445 45,983 23,448 
2007 407,475,642 203,313 97,649 23,779 41,379 24,357 
2008 401,257,951 224,705 85,157 21,259 38,808 24,347 
2009 360,967,962 225,073 72,729 17,896 37,914 28,273 
                                                 
55 INA §212(a)(9). 
56 INA §276. 
57 According to CBP (CRS communication with CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013), the uptick 
in notices to appear observable since FY2011 reflects a pair of changes in recent years: in 2010 OFO directed a policy 
change to place certain arriving LPRs with criminal records in removal proceedings rather than permitting them to 
enter with deferred inspection orders, resulting in a rise in NTAs; and there has been an increase in the number of 
unaccompanied alien children arriving at ports of entry, who (pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008) must be placed into removal proceedings and served with an NTA under certain 
conditions.  
Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry 
 
Congressional Research Service 16 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total 
Admitted 
Total 
Denied 
Admission 
Withdrawal of 
Application 
Notice to 
Appear 
Expedited 
Removal 
Criminal 
Arrests 
2010 352,752,501 231,045 75,866 19,189 38,590 27,868 
2011 340,135,068 215,248 62,726 17,667 40,531 25,989 
2012 351,407,588 195,142 55,171 21,928 34,802 24,087 
2013 361,964,732 204,633 52,104 23,730 34,826 24,187 
Source: Data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
Notes: In addition to the categories listed in this table, aliens denied admission include crewmembers detained 
on board vessels (i.e., denied shore leave), persons paroled into the United States, persons permitted to enter 
with deferred inspection orders, persons granted voluntary return, and visa waiver program travelers refused 
admission, among others. Criminal arrests include U.S. citizens. 
Table 2 also reveals two apparent trends in enforcement outcomes at POEs. First, the number of 
aliens permitted to withdraw their applications for admission has fallen steadily from about 
96,000 in FY2005 to about 52,000 in FY2013. According to CBP, this reduction is explained, at 
least in part, by a 2008 OFO directive permitting officers to exercise discretion in certain cases 
where applicants for admission are technically inadmissible due to a minor documentary 
deficiency, such as a recently expired passport or nonimmigrant visa. In such cases, aliens may be 
permitted to correct their documentation and reapply for admission at a later date and time 
without being required to formally withdraw an application for admission.58 
Second, the number of aliens placed in expedited removal fell by about one-third between 
FY2005 and FY2009 (from about 55,000 to about 38,000), and has remained roughly flat since 
that time. It is not clear whether the initial drop in ER cases reflected a policy change, a change in 
the demographics of arriving aliens, or a statistical anomaly. Overall, the data in Table 2 do not 
appear to reflect a significant shift at POEs toward “high consequence” enforcement outcomes 
(i.e., an increase in the proportion of removable aliens facing criminal charges and/or formal 
removal). This trend stands in contrast to enforcement trends between ports of entry, where the 
Border Patrol has more systematically implemented CBP’s Consequence Delivery System.59 
Random Compliance Examination (COMPEX) Program  
CBP’s Random Compliance Examination (COMPEX) program was established by the legacy 
U.S. Customs Service in 1999 to gather information about the effectiveness of the passenger 
inspections process, and CBP expanded the program after the creation of DHS to also encompass 
more general immigration and agricultural inspection activities. The program selects a random 
sample of vehicles and air passengers who would be cleared for admission to the United States 
during primary inspection, and subjects the sample to a detailed secondary examination. CBP 
counts violations detected in the sample of otherwise-cleared travelers to estimate the number of 
undetected violations.  
                                                 
58 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
59 The Consequence Delivery System is a CBP program to promote formal removal, criminal charges, lateral 
repatriation, and other “high consequence” enforcement outcomes for aliens apprehended at the Southwest border; for a 
fuller discussion see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. 
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In FY2012, CBP reports that the COMPEX program was operational at 19 commercial airports 
representing over 80% of traveler volume, and at 105 land POEs representing over 94% of private 
vehicle volume.60 The program conducted over 640,000 random secondary inspections, including 
184,000 air passengers and 456,000 vehicles at land POEs. Overall, a very small percentage of 
travelers in the sample were found to have committed a major violation.61 
Theoretically, the COMPEX program offers a powerful tool to estimate illegal flows and CBP’s 
effectiveness rate at POEs. Whereas developing accurate and reliable estimates of illegal flows 
and of the effectiveness of enforcement between POEs is notoriously difficult because of 
uncertainty about the number of unobserved inflows,62 detailed secondary inspections on a 
sample of inflows at POEs should produce an accurate count of violations within this group. And 
as long as the sample is statistically valid, CBP could use COMPEX results to estimate total 
illegal inflows and the apprehension rate at POEs. 
On the other hand, COMPEX is limited in some respects as a tool for describing illegal 
immigration flows. One limitation is that the program covers air passengers and personal vehicles 
at land POEs, but does not cover sea passengers, pedestrians at land POEs, or most cargo 
operations.63 Second, while a CBP officer may order the collection of biometric data as part of a 
COMPEX secondary inspection, such data is not collected systematically. As a result, while the 
program likely detects certain types of illegal migration through POEs (i.e., unauthorized 
immigrants hidden within passenger vehicles), COMPEX is not designed to detect certain other 
illegal inflows (i.e., unauthorized immigrants hidden within cargo containers or unauthorized 
immigrants using fraudulent documents or documents belonging to another person—not to 
mention flows of legal visitors who eventually overstay a nonimmigrant visa).  
A third limitation is that while COMPEX is designed to produce a statistically valid estimate of 
the overall number of POE violations, the program is not designed to measure violations within 
specific subcategories of flows, including the subcategory of illegal migration.64 In addition, 
while sampling at land POEs is based on the random assignment of cases through the TECS 
system, sampling at airports is based on the manual selection of cases by port managers and 
senior officers, which may introduce sample bias. Reportedly, COMPEX inspections also may be 
suspended at certain ports and certain times in order to speed processing times.65 For all of these 
reasons, it is not possible, based on COMPEX findings, to draw reliable inferences about total 
illegal inflows through POEs. 
A final concern about COMPEX is that information about the program has not been widely 
available. CBP considers such information law-enforcement sensitive, and does not publish 
information about COMPEX results or methodology; Congress has never held a public hearing 
on the program; and it has never been the subject of an extensive Government Accountability 
                                                 
60 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, March 31, 2013. 
61 Specific program results are considered law enforcement sensitive and are not available for publication. 
62 See CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. 
63 CBP is developing an expansion of COMPEX to extent to pedestrian crossing at land POEs; this component of the 
program is currently being pilot tested and is expected to become formally operational in FY2015. 
64 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
65 See Testimony of National Treasury Employees Union President Colleen M. Kelley, U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Cargo Security Threats at Land 
Ports of Entry, 111th Cong., 1st sess., October 22, 2009. 
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Office (GAO) study.66 These limitations make it difficult to evaluate the program or to weigh 
potential program reforms (also see “Illegal Migration through Ports of Entry”). 
Trusted Traveler Programs 
Pursuant to §7209(k) of the IRTPA, CBP manages a number of “trusted traveler” programs that 
permit travelers to voluntarily provide detailed biometric and biographic data to CBP, and thereby 
to be eligible for expedited admission at POEs. Trusted traveler programs are designed to 
facilitate the admission of known, low-risk travelers and to strengthen security by focusing 
enforcement resources on unknown travelers (also see “Trusted Traveler Programs: Issues for 
Congress”). 
Global Entry 
The main trusted traveler program is Global Entry, which is open to U.S. citizens and LPRs, 
Dutch citizens, South Korean citizens, and Mexican nationals. Canadian nationals also may 
receive Global Entry benefits by joining NEXUS (not an acronym; see “NEXUS”).67 In addition 
to meeting the nationality requirement, Global Entry applicants must not 
• provide false or incomplete application information; 
• have any previous criminal convictions or outstanding warrants; 
• have any previous immigration violations; 
• be the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation; 
• be inadmissible to the United States;  
• have any known or suspected terrorist connections; or 
• be unable to satisfy CBP that they are low risk. 
Applicants are required to provide biometric data and participate in an in-person interview. 
Applicants are checked against a variety of national security and criminal databases during the 
initial application and upon each visit to the United States; and the entire trusted traveler list also 
is subject to regular re-checks against certain databases. 
In general, Global Entry members are eligible for expedited processing at participating POEs, 
which include 44 airports in the United States, Canada, Ireland, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, 
and Puerto Rico.68 Instead of the normal primary and customs inspections, members present their 
machine-readable travel documents (via a card-swipe system), fingerprints (via a scanner), and 
customs declarations (via touchscreen) at an automated Global Entry kiosk. In most cases, the 
kiosk issues a receipt, and travelers may claim their bags and exit into the airport without further 
                                                 
66 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) initiated a major review of the COMPEX program in July 2001, but 
suspended the study following the 9/11 attacks; see GAO, Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be 
Strengthened, GAO-02-215R, December 3, 2001. Other GAO work on COMPEX has been more limited. 
67 Eligibility criteria for Global Entry are defined in 8 C.F.R. §235.12. 
68 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §235.12, a list of participating Global Entry locations is available at 
http://www.globalentry.gov/locations.html.  
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inspection. Global Entry members still may be selected for secondary inspection on the basis of 
derogatory information during the screening process or at random. 
NEXUS 
NEXUS (not an acronym) is a jointly-managed U.S.-Canadian trusted traveler program. NEXUS 
applicants must meet similar eligibility requirements as those for Global Entry, and must be 
approved by both countries. As noted, NEXUS members automatically are eligible to use Global 
Entry kiosks and enjoy similar benefits at Global Entry locations. NEXUS members also receive 
a secure, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)69 photo ID card that is Western Hemisphere 
Travel Initiative (WHTI) compliant, and that offers expedited processing through dedicated 
NEXUS travel lanes at 20 land POEs on the U.S.-Canadian border.70  
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) 
The Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program is a trusted 
traveler program that provides similar benefits at the U.S.-Mexico border as NEXUS provides at 
the U.S.-Canada border. SENTRI members receive a WHTI-compliant RFID card, which may be 
used at 11 land POEs.71 Unlike NEXUS, SENTRI is not jointly managed by the United States and 
Mexico. SENTRI members also must register their vehicles with the program, and may only use 
SENTRI lanes while driving registered vehicles. SENTRI applicants are subject to somewhat 
more stringent application requirements, and must provide  
• original evidence of citizenship; 
• original evidence of admissibility to the United States (for non-U.S. citizens);  
• driver’s license or state ID document; 
• vehicle registration and proof of insurance or a notarized letter authorizing use of 
the vehicle if the SENTRI applicant is not the vehicle owner; 
• evidence of employment or financial support; and 
• evidence of residence. 
Table 3 summarizes cumulative trusted traveler program membership for FY2009-FY2013. As 
Table 3 indicates, all three programs have grown substantially during this period, with NEXUS 
and SENTRI growing five-fold and seven-fold, respectively, and Global Entry growing by a 
factor of 45. As of FY2013, Global Entry and NEXUS each counted over 900,000 members, 
while SENTRI included almost 360,000.  
                                                 
69 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a contactless integrated circuit technology that permits scanners to read 
data tags quickly and remotely; EZ-Pass highway toll transponders are a familiar example. 
70 A list of ports with dedicated NEXUS lanes and hours of operation is available at http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/prog/nexus/
land-terre-eng.html#where-ou.  
71 A list of ports with dedicated Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) lanes is available 
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/sentri.xml. 
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Table 3. Cumulative Membership in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs, FY2009-FY2013 
Fiscal Year Global Entry NEXUS SENTRI 
2009 20,166 141,537 44,242 
2010 76,435 457,630 229,224 
2011 200,380 589,871 263,937 
2012 431,004 737,302 301,889 
2013 935,510 900,499 357,731 
Source: CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
Note: Enrollment figures for each fiscal year are cumulative. 
Table 4 describes the annual number of travelers admitted through NEXUS and SENTRI lanes 
and Global Entry kiosks in FY2010-FY2013. As Table 4 indicates, trusted traveler flows have 
also increased during this period, though not as quickly as program membership, with Global 
Entry flows increasing seven-fold since FY2010, NEXUS flows doubling during this period, and 
SENTRI flows growing by about 50%.  
Table 4. Annual Travelers Admitted, CBP Trusted Traveler Programs, FY2010-FY2013 
Fiscal Year Global Entry NEXUS SENTRI 
2010 344,161 2,843,861 12,520,286 
2011 893,532 3,784,569 15,866,233 
2012 1,670,790 5,114,107 17,816,896 
2013 2,785,205 5,902,762 19,743,147 
Source: CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, December 30, 2013. 
Outbound Enforcement  
At certain land ports on the Southern border, travelers may be subject to screening and potential 
inspection as they depart the United States. Outbound enforcement is managed by the Outbound 
Programs Division within the Office of Field Operations. The division’s mandate focuses on 
addressing violence in Mexico and the Mexico-United States drug trade by interdicting illegal 
currency, arms, and ammunition outflows. DHS reports that about 700 CBP officers participate in 
the outbound enforcement program.72  
Table 5 describes annual seizures by the Outbound Programs Division for FY2009-FY2013. As 
Table 5 indicates, outbound enforcement seized a total of about 5,100 kilograms of illegal drugs 
during this period in 3,442 separate seizure incidents; $221 million worth of illegal currency 
exports; 8,210 illegal weapons, and about 12.1 million rounds of ammunition. Some experts view 
the number of southbound drug seizures—almost 3 per day in FY2013—as an indicator of the 
global nature of the market for illegal drugs, and of the United States’ emerging role as a 
                                                 
72 See DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Salaries and Expenses, Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget 
Justification, p. 90. 
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transshipment country for illegal drugs. At the same time, while seizure incidents have increased 
since FY2009, the average seizure size fell sharply in FY2013. Illegal currency and ammunition 
seizures are also down since FY2009 and FY2010, respectively. It is not clear whether the recent 
drop in illegal drug volume and the sustained drops in currency and ammunition seizures reflect 
changes in tactics by drug trafficking organizations or are statistical anomalies. 
Table 5. CBP Outbound Enforcement Seizures, FY2009-FY2013  
Fiscal 
Year 
Illegal Drugs 
(kilograms) 
Illegal Drugs 
(incidents) 
Currency 
(dollars) Weapons  
Ammunition 
Rounds 
2009 336 438 58,120,418 435 2,237,619 
2010 878 527 46,813,819 2,351 7,340,472 
2011 1,434 549 47,303,379 1,986 1,960,636 
2012 1,911 897 31,665,153 653 213,579 
2013 540 1,031 37,122,471 2,785 387,724 
Total 5,099 3,442 221,025,240 8,210 12,140,030 
Source: CBP Office of Congressional Affairs December 30, 2013. 
Some people have argued that the United States should place greater emphasis on outbound 
enforcement to disrupt transnational criminal operations. According to this view, preventing U.S.-
Mexico money and currency flows would eliminate the incentive for Mexico-U.S. drug flows, 
while also reducing criminal organizations’ firepower.73  
Outbound enforcement efforts confront a number of challenges, however. Laws restricting 
international currency transfers are notoriously difficult to enforce.74 Outbound enforcement also 
takes resources away from inbound inspections, so that increasing outbound screening may add to 
inbound delays or compromise inbound security. In addition, most outbound lanes are not 
equipped with inspection infrastructure, leaving officers exposed to the elements and to nearby 
traffic flows.75 Limited outbound lanes also mean that inspections may result in long waits for 
outbound travelers. Partly to address these concerns, outbound enforcement operations are 
normally short-term surges, followed by periods of reduced inspections.76 Yet some analysts have 
argued that sophisticated criminal organizations can defeat enforcement surges by monitoring 
outbound lanes, and by suspending high value outflows whenever a surge is underway. 
                                                 
73 See CRS Report R41547, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement; also see Terry 
Goddard, How to Fix a Broken Border: Hit the Cartels Where It Hurts, American Immigration Council, Washington, 
DC, September 2011. 
74 Among other challenges, money may flow across the border in unrestricted amounts through “stored value” cards; 
and banks may permit questionable money transfers by establishing “funnel” accounts. See Ibid.; and GAO, Challenges 
Exist in the Federal Government’s Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling, GAO-11-73, October 2010. 
75 See U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening 
the Federal Government’s Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling GAO 11-407, March 9, 2011. 
76 See DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Salaries and Expenses, Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Submission, 
p. 90. In addition to these episodic surges, port officials have told CRS that 100% of outbound vehicle and pedestrian 
traffic at some southwest border POEs is subject to visual screening (i.e., an officers watches outbound flows); and 
officers may temporarily close exit lanes to interview and/or inspect suspicious travelers. 
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Entry-Exit System: Implementation 
As noted elsewhere, Section 110 IIRIRA, as amended, requires DHS to implement an automatic, 
biometric entry-exit system that covers all non-citizen travelers into and out of the United States 
and that identifies visa overstayers (see “Entry-Exit System: Legislative Requirements”). Prior to 
1997, the INS collected entry-exit data manually by obtaining paper copies of traveler’s I-94 
records (see “I-94 Arrival/Departure Records”), and an INS contractor manually keyed in data 
from the forms. This system was unreliable because paper forms were not consistently collected 
(particularly departure forms); forms were not timely provided to the contractor; and data input 
errors were widespread.77 INS initiated a pilot program in 1997 to further automate I-94 data 
collection by having airlines provide magnetic stripe I-94 arrival cards. Passengers passed the 
cards to INS agents at POEs during primary inspection. The automated system also proved 
problematic, however, because airlines were reluctant to participate, because departure cards still 
were not reliably collected, and because the system did not cover land travelers, among other 
shortcomings.78 
With the passage of new entry-exit mandates in 2000-2001 (see “Entry-Exit system: Legislative 
Requirements”) and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, the 
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program was established 
within DHS in 2004 to manage the entry-exit system. US-VISIT was renamed the Office of 
Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) in March 2013.79 CBP works with OBIM to collect and 
manage entry-exit data as described below. 
Entry-Exit Databases  
Entry-exit data are stored in two DHS databases: the Arrival and Departure Information System 
(ADIS) and the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). 
Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) 
ADIS includes biographic traveler identification data (name, date of birth, nationality, gender, 
passport number and country, U.S. visa number, and related information), arrival and departure 
information (POE and travel date), and a person-specific Fingerprint Identification Number 
System (FINS) identifier that allows ADIS to be cross-referenced with the IDENT system (see 
“Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)”).80 Although ADIS includes the FINS 
biometric identifier, ADIS is a biographic database because its records are populated by reading 
                                                 
77 See Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Automated I-
94 System, 2001. 
78 Ibid.; also see GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure 
Planning, GAO-03-563, June 2003. 
79 The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) is a division within DHS’s National Protection and Programs 
Directorate. The Administration’s FY2014 budget request proposed (for the second year in a row) to eliminate US-
VISIT/OBIM and to transfer the entry-exit program into CBP and ICE, but both chambers rejected the 
Administration’s proposed realignment during the FY2014 cycle. See CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland 
Security: FY2014 Appropriations. 
80 For a fuller discussion of the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), see 68 Federal Register 69412. 
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identity documents, rather than by capturing fingerprints or other physiological data directly from 
the traveler. As of September 30, 2013, ADIS included over 280 million unique records.81 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) 
IDENT includes biographic data (including name, aliases, date of birth, phone numbers, 
addresses, nationality, personal descriptive data), biometric identifiers (including fingerprints and 
photographs), and information about subjects’ previous immigration enforcement histories 
(including previous immigration apprehensions and arrests). IDENT is a fully biometric database 
that makes use of fingerprint scanners and digital cameras to collect physical data directly from 
database subjects. As of September 30, 2013, IDENT included over 160 million unique records.82 
The IDENT database initially was designed to capture only index fingerprints (i.e., two prints per 
person), and mainly was conceived of as a tool for tracking foreign visitors and identifying visa 
overstayers. With the creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) in 1999,83 the legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and the FBI decided to integrate the IDENT and IAFIS databases to 
better identify criminal aliens. This integration eventually required the reconfiguration of IDENT 
as a ten-print system. It took several years to complete this transition, but by 2010 all CBP and 
Border Patrol locations had deployed fully integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstations.84 
Particularly after the 9/11 attacks, the entry-exit system increasingly was seen as a national 
security tool for vetting arriving passengers. The USA PATRIOT Act required that the system be 
designed to permit background checks against relevant databases and identity verification 
throughout the visa application and admissions processes (see “Entry-Exit System: Legislative 
Requirements”). As of September 30, 2013, the IDENT security watchlist included 7.2 million 
people.85 
Collection of Entry Data 
Under US-VISIT/OBIM, the automated I-94 pilot program was discontinued, and entry data 
collection has been integrated into the immigration inspections process. In general, CBP officers 
collect entry data at ports of entry, and entry records automatically are added to the ADIS and (as 
appropriate) IDENT databases.  
Entry data collection has been enhanced in three main ways in the post-9/11 period. First, 
pursuant to the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 106-396) and the IRTPA (P.L. 108-
458), almost all travelers to the United States must present machine-readable passports or 
                                                 
81 Office of Biometric Identify Management (OBIM), Office of Congressional Affairs, November 15, 2013. 
82 Ibid. 
83 The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) database includes electronic ten-print records of 
more than 66 million subjects in its criminal master file along with more than 25 million civil fingerprints. See Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, “Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System,” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis. 
84 For a fuller discussion of IDENT/IAFIS integration, see CRS Report RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. 
Border Patrol. 
85 Office of Biometric Identify Management (OBIM), Office of Congressional Affairs, November 15, 2013. 
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similarly secure travel documents to enter the country (see “Inspections for Admissions”). These 
standards are designed to improve biographic data collection by combatting document and 
identity fraud and reducing data input errors by automating information capture.  
Second, beginning in 2004, US-VISIT deployed integrated biometric workstations (i.e., 
fingerprint scanners) at POEs to facilitate biometric data collection. Workstations were deployed 
at 115 airports and 14 sea ports beginning in January 2004, expanded to the 50 busiest land POEs 
by the end of 2004, and have been operational at almost all POEs since December 2006.86 
Third, under a final rule published in 2009, all non-U.S. citizens entering the United States are 
required to provide biometric data with the exceptions of Canadian nationals admitted as visitors, 
LPRs returning from cruises that begin and end in the United States or entering at land ports of 
entry, Mexican nationals with border crossing cards (BCCs),87 and travelers with other visas 
explicitly exempted from the program.88 In practice, the 2009 rule means that virtually all arriving 
non-citizens at air and seaports (other than U.S. LPRs returning from U.S.-based cruises) are 
required to provide biometric data during primary inspection. At land ports, arriving passengers 
only provide biometric data in secondary inspection (see “Secondary Inspections”). It bears 
emphasis that while a relatively small number of visa categories are exempted from the biometric 
requirement, these exemptions cover the majority of foreign visitors to the United States.89 
Collection of Exit Data 
In general, the United States does not have a history of collecting exit data from departing 
travelers. (In contrast, European Union member states, among other countries, for many years 
have required that people pass through passport control booths not only upon admission to the 
country, but also prior to their departure.) As a result, DHS and its predecessor agency have 
confronted inadequate port infrastructure and staffing to readily implement exit data collection as 
required by existing law.  
Since 2004, DHS has tested six exit data pilot programs and demonstration projects described 
below. Four of the programs have been described as problematic, and have been discontinued; but 
                                                 
86 According to a 2009 GAO report, US-VISIT was operational at all 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land 
ports. US-VISIT was not deployed to the remaining land POE’s because most visitors subject to US-VISIT 
requirements were not authorized to use them or because, in two cases, the ports did not have the necessary 
transmission lines to operate US-VISIT. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Key US-
VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13, 
November 2009, p. 7, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1013.pdf. 
87 Border crossing cards (BCC, also known as “laser visas”) are short-term multiple-entry, 10-year nonimmigrant visas 
that may be issued to certain citizens of Mexico for business or tourism. BCC holders are permitted to visit the United 
States for up to 30 days and must remain within a zone up to 25 miles from the border in Texas, New Mexico, and 
California or within 75 miles of the border in Arizona. 
88 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (U.S.-VISIT) in Conjunction with the Final Rule (73 FR 7743), 
Enrollment of Additional Alien in US-VISIT,” February 10, 2009. 
89 According to DHS data, there were about 165 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United States in FY2012, 
including about 54 million (33%) I-94 admissions (generally required to provide biometric data) and about 106 million 
tourists and business travelers from Canada and Mexicans with BCCs (generally exempted from the biometric 
requirement); see Randall Monger, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2012, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, August 2103, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/ois_ni_fr_2012.pdf. 
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two programs involving biographic information sharing with air carriers and with the government 
of Canada have been described by DHS as successful, and are ongoing. 
2004-2007: Air/Sea Exit Pilot Program  
Between January 2004 and May 2007, US-VISIT tested three different biometric exit 
technologies at 12 airports and 2 seaports under the so-called Increment 1B Pilot Program. At 
different airports and seaports, the program tested biometric collection kiosks located inside 
secure checkpoints, biometric collection mobile devices located in departure gate areas, and a 
combination of kiosks and mobile validator devices. DHS’s evaluation of the program reportedly 
found that all three technologies and scenarios successfully captured biometric and biographic 
information, and that data collection required between 60 and 90 seconds per passenger.90 
Based on a series of reports in 2005-2007, GAO concluded in 2007 that the Increment 1B air and 
sea pilot had “not been managed well”; and GAO recommended that DHS discontinue the 
program. In addition to concerns about program planning, oversight, and analysis of alternatives, 
GAO found that only 24% of travelers subject to US-VISIT requirements complied with the exit 
procedures, and that the program lacked enforcement measures and had not evaluated the effect 
of adding such measures.91 According to DHS’s evaluation of the program, traveler compliance 
could be improved by integrating biometric data collection into the normal departure flow.92 
2005-2006: Land Exit Proof of Concept 
The lack of exit infrastructure and the potential for congestion as a result of exit data collection 
are viewed as particularly problematic at land POEs. Between August 2005 and November 2006, 
DHS operated a land exit proof-of-concept demonstration project at five ports of entry on the 
southern and northern borders to test the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology for tracking departures. Under the project, RFID tags were added to about 200,000 I-
94 forms issued to nonimmigrant visitors.93 The goal of the project was to capture exit data with 
minimal new infrastructure or DHS staffing and without adding to border congestion.94 
RFID technology is limited to biographic data, however. In addition, based on the demonstration 
project, RFID data collection proved unreliable, with successful data collection from RFID tags 
rates as low as 14% at some ports, and with scanners unable to consistently distinguish between 
RFID entries and exits.95 Thus, the conclusion drawn by GAO from the demonstration project 
was that RFID appears to be an inappropriate technology for exit data collection.96 
                                                 
90 DHS, US-VISIT Air Exit Pilots Evaluation Report, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, Washington, DC, October 
26, 2009, p. 60. 
91 GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects for Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear, GAO-07-1044T, June 
28, 2007, pp. 7-8. 
92 DHS, US-VISIT Air Exit Pilots Fiscal Year 2009 Report, p. 60. 
93 Marc Songini, “DHS Nixes Use of RFID In Border Security Program,” Computer World, February 15, 2007. 
94 For a fuller discussion, see GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-378T, January 31, 2007. 
95 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
96 GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable 
Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13, January 2009, p. 9. 
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2009: Air Exit Pilot Program  
Between May and July of 2009, US-VISIT worked with CBP and the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) to operate a pair of biometric air exit pilot programs. At the Detroit airport, 
CBP officers collected biometric data from aliens subject to US-VISIT at departure gates for 
selected international flights. Data was usually collected in aircraft jetways, between air carrier 
boarding pass collection and travelers’ entry onto aircraft. Certain CBP officers were assigned to 
review travelers’ documents to identify people subject to the program, who were then referred to 
additional officers for data collection. At the Atlanta airport, TSA officers screened travelers prior 
to their entry into the TSA security checkpoint to identify people subject to US-VISIT 
requirements. Such people were referred to a special line within the checkpoint, where other TSA 
officers collected their biometric data.97 
DHS concluded that the pilot generally confirmed that biometric data may be collected from 
departing travelers. During the course of the program, about 500,000 travelers were screened by 
CBP and TSA officers; about 30,000 were identified as subject to US-VISIT; and only one 
traveler refused to provide his biometric data.98 Data collection only required a few seconds per 
passenger, and produced data of adequate quality for enrollment in IDENT.99  
On the other hand, DHS also found that identifying travelers subject to US-VISIT requirements 
necessitated “extensive interaction” between screeners and travelers, that scaling up a program to 
cover all departures would greatly exceed available staffing capacity, that flight delays and related 
problems interfered with data collection, and that pilots and crew often boarded flights too early 
to be enrolled by CBP officers.100 Locating US-VISIT screening and data collection at TSA 
checkpoints also had an impact on a large number of U.S. citizens and passengers scheduled for 
domestic flights;101 and screening at TSA checkpoints arguably is less reliable than jetway 
screening when it comes to ensuring that people providing exit data actually leave the country. 
In addition to these specific concerns, DHS’s more extensive review of its biometric exit testing 
concluded that a comprehensive biometric air exit system “faces enormous cost and logistical 
challenges,” with funding requirements projected to total about $3 billion over a 10 year period. 
For these reasons, in 2010 DHS adopted a plan to focus in the near-term on enhanced biographic 
data collection and analysis to identify potential overstayers, and to invest in research and 
development of emerging biometric technology to be employed in a future exit system.102 
2009-2010: H-2A and H-2B Land Exit Pilot Program  
In December 2009, US-VISIT and CBP initiated a pilot program to collect biometric data from 
exiting H-2A and H-2B temporary workers.103 The pilot deployed kiosks adapted for outdoor use, 
                                                 
97 DHS, US-VISIT Air Exit Pilots Fiscal Year 2009 Report, pp. 5-8. 
98 Ibid., pp. iii-iv. 
99 Ibid., p. vi. 
100 Ibid., pp. v – vi. 
101 Ibid., p. vii. 
102 DHS, Comprehensive Biometric Air Exit Plan, Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress, Washington, DC, May 11, 
2012, pp. 3-4. 
103 H-2A visas permit certain foreign workers to perform temporary nonagricultural service or labor, and H-2B visas 
permit certain foreign workers to perform non-agricultural service or labor; see CRS Report R42434, Immigration of 
(continued...) 
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and applied to certain H-2A and H-2B workers who entered and exited through the San Luis, AZ 
and Douglas, AZ POEs.104 DHS reportedly plans to use information from the land exit pilot 
program to inform future land exit program planning,105 but CRS has not been able to locate 
additional information about the program. 
2008—Ongoing: Air Carrier Information Sharing 
Since 2008, under the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) program, air and sea 
carriers are required to provide CBP with electronic copies of passenger and crew manifests prior 
to the departure of all international flights and voyages to or from the United States. For air 
carriers, such data must be provided prior to securing aircraft doors. CBP vets inbound passenger 
manifests against terrorist watchlist data, and CBP adds passenger arrival and departure data to 
the ADIS biographic database. According to DHS officials, air carrier compliance with APIS 
requirements has been close to 100% since 2010, and analysis of ADIS records allows DHS to 
identify air travelers who may have overstayed their visas (also see “Overstay Analysis”).106 
While DHS apparently views the APIS program as a viable system for tracking air and sea exits, 
the system may be seen as not meeting the entry-exit system’s legislative requirements in at least 
three ways. First, although air and sea carriers review passengers’ passports prior to issuing a 
boarding pass, APIS does not include a mechanism to authenticate biometric data (i.e., APIS only 
collects biographic data). Second, relatedly, the APIS system is not designed to reliably insure 
that the same individual who checks in for a flight or voyage actually boards the aircraft or vessel. 
Third, although APIS provides CBP with electronic passenger manifest lists, the manifests are 
generated by carrier agents during the check-in process; such “manual” data may be less secure 
than data collected directly from travelers’ passports (i.e., “machine-readable” data).107 
2012—Ongoing: U.S.-Canada Information Sharing 
On February 4, 2011, President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper signed a joint 
declaration describing their shared visions for a common approach to perimeter security and 
economic competitiveness: the Beyond the Border agreement.108 Among other provisions, the 
agreement calls for the two countries to develop an integrated entry-exit system so that the record 
of a land entry into one country establishes an exit record from the other. The first phase of the 
program ran from September 2012 – January 2013, and included the exchange of biographic 
records for third country nationals and permanent residents (i.e., for persons other than U.S. or 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Temporary Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related Issues, by Andorra Bruno. 
104 GAO-10-13, p. 19. 
105 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could 
Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411, April 2011, p. 11. 
106 DHS briefing for CRS, April 3, 2013. 
107 The Senate-passed Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744) would 
require air carriers to collect machine readable exit data from departing passengers. Some have argued that a machine 
readable system would be more secure. For example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing, some people 
hypothesized that the manual input of passenger name information contributed to alleged bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 
ability, after previously being investigated by the FBI, to travel back and forth to Russia without triggering additional 
scrutiny, though it appears that his travel did generate a “hit” against certain passenger name checks.  
108 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report 96-397, Canada-U.S. Relations. 
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Canadian citizens) at four designated POEs. Canada was able to reconcile 94.5% of U.S. entries 
(i.e., Canadian exits) with Canadian immigration databases, and the United States was able to 
reconcile 97.4% of Canadian entries.109 Based on these results, the countries initiated phase 2 of 
the pilot program in June 2013, expanding data collection to all automated POEs on the U.S.-
Canada border.110 
DHS apparently views the U.S.-Canadian integrated entry-exit system as a promising approach 
for collecting exit data at the northern border.111 Under the current agreement, such information 
sharing will be limited to biographic data. DHS’ ability to treat Canadian entry data as a reliable 
record of U.S. exits depends on both the organizational capacity of the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA), and on a high level of trust and collaboration between CBSA and CBP.  
Overstay Analysis  
Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) Overstay Analysis Unit 
identifies potential visa overstayers by matching ADIS arrival and departure records. ICE’s 
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) prioritizes certain overstay leads for 
further investigation. According to GAO’s analysis of DHS data, DHS’s enhanced biographic exit 
program reviewed a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records in 2011. About half of these 
cases (863,000) were found to have departed the United States or to have adjusted status. Out of 
the remaining records, along with 82,000 additional cases identified by CTCEU (i.e., a total of 
839,000 records), DHS prioritized 1,901 (0.2% of overstayers; 0.1% of all cases initially 
reviewed) as possible national security or public safety risks. Further investigation of these high 
priority cases found that 1,013 individuals had departed the United States or adjusted to a lawful 
migration status, 9 individuals were arrested, and 481 individuals were the subject of ongoing 
ICE enforcement efforts as of March 2013, among other outcomes.112  
The GAO also determined that about 1.2 million ADIS arrival records could not be matched to 
departure data, and raised questions about the quality of DHS’s overstay data.113 Moreover, DHS 
and its predecessor agency have not provided Congress with statutorily required reports on visa 
overstays since 1994, though then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano testified in February 2013 
that the department would report to Congress by the end of the year.114  
                                                 
109 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and DHS, “Entry/Exit Information System Phase I Joint Canada-United 
States Report,” May 8, 2013. 
110 CBSA, “Entry Exit Initiative – Phase II Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Executive Summary,” June 28, 2013. It is 
not clear of the two countries have entered into Phase III of the agreement. 
111 DHS briefing for CRS, April 3, 2013; also see Testimony of DHS Assistant Secretary David Heyman, U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on Judiciary, Implementation of an Entry-Exit System: Still Waiting After All These Years, 
113th Cong., 1st sess., November 13, 2013. Hereafter: Heyman Testimony, 2013. 
112 GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS’s Data and Improve Planning for a 
Biometric Air Exit Program, GAO-13-683, July 2013, pp. 12-14. 
113 Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
114 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, 113th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2013. Hereafter: Napolitano testimony, 2013. 
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Issues for Congress  
Screening for Infectious diseases at POEs115 
News of humans infected with Ebola in West Africa has heightened concerns about the health 
screening of people arriving in the United States. Under current law, foreign nationals not already 
legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain 
a visa and submit to an inspection to be admitted.116 They must first meet a set of criteria 
specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that determine whether they are eligible 
for admission. Moreover, they must not be deemed inadmissible according to specified grounds in 
the INA. One of the reasons why a foreign national might be deemed inadmissible is on health-
related grounds.117 
From an immigration standpoint, an outbreak of an infectious disease places substantial 
procedural and resource pressures on CBP, which is charged with screening all travelers at land, 
sea, and air ports of entry for admission. CBP works in conjunction with the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) in HHS to monitor travelers for health-related risks and attempt to 
contain any diseases that may be spread by travelers coming from abroad.  
The CDC is the lead agency charged with protection against communicable diseases and is 
responsible for providing the technical instructions to CBP officers. CDC officials are not present 
at the border on a day-to-day basis, but there are quarantine stations located in a number of 
international airports and near a few land ports of entry. However, these stations constitute a small 
fraction of the 329 ports of entry operated by CBP. Even fully staffed quarantine stations are not 
in a position to perform routine health screening on all passengers crossing the border as a 
standard operating procedure. 
Rather than staffing all the POEs, the CDC, through their Division of Global Migration and 
Quarantine (DGMQ),118 trains CBP inspectors to watch for ill persons and items of public health 
concern. The CBP Inspector’s Field Manual states that CBP officers are responsible for observing 
all travelers for obvious signs and symptoms of quarantinable and communicable diseases, such 
as (1) fever, which could be detected by a flushed complexion, shivering, or profuse sweating; (2) 
jaundice (unusual yellowing of skin and eyes); (3) respiratory problems, such as severe cough or 
difficulty breathing; (4) bleeding from the eyes, nose, gums, or ears or from wounds; and (5) 
                                                 
115 Except as otherwise noted, this section is based on CRS Report R40570, Immigration Policies and Issues on Health-
Related Grounds for Exclusion. 
116 Authorities to except or to waive visa requirements are specified in law, such as the broad parole authority of the 
Attorney General under §212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the specific authority of the Visa 
Waiver Program in §217 of the INA. 
117 Other grounds for exclusion include criminal history; security and terrorist concerns; public charge (e.g., indigence); 
seeking to work without proper labor certification; illegal entry and immigration law violations; ineligible for 
citizenship; and aliens previously removed. For more information, see CRS Report RL32256, Visa Policy: Roles of the 
Departments of State and Homeland Security, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
118 See CDC, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, http://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dgmq/. In addition to non-
regulatory activities, DGMQ has regulatory authority to prevent the introduction, transmission, and interstate spread of 
communicable diseases into the United States and its territories. 
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unexplained weakness or paralysis.119 However, CBP officers are not medically trained or 
qualified to physically examine or diagnose illness among arriving travelers.120 
The CDC also approves the physicians used at the POEs, and tests are performed in consultation 
with and in accordance with CDC guidance. CDC officials are to be stationed at the border during 
immigration emergencies and other periods when public health may be threatened.121 
In the current context of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the Administration has established 
new screening procedures at five airports122 and requires all persons whose travel originated in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to enter the United States through these five airports.123 The 
airports were selected because reportedly they represent more than 94% of the travelers coming 
from those three countries. When passengers arrive whose travel originated in one of the 
aforementioned countries—including U.S. citizens—they are escorted to a separate area for 
additional screening. The travelers fill out an extensive questionnaire, and have their temperature 
taken. Staff from the CDC is present at these airports to assist with the screening. Travelers 
without febrile illness or symptoms of Ebola will be monitored two times a day by state and local 
health departments for 21 days from their departure from West Africa.124 These travelers are also 
given a kit that contains a tracking log, a pictorial description of Ebola symptoms, a thermometer, 
and a wallet card with information on whom to contact if they have symptoms that can be 
presented to a health care provider if necessary. Those that have a fever or have symptoms 
consistent with Ebola will be immediately isolated.125 
                                                 
119 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Inspector’s Field Manual, Chapter 17, Section 9, Washington, DC, March 
2006. 
120 In addition to the signs and symptoms of quarantinable and communicable diseases listed above, a person is 
considered to be ill in terms of foreign quarantine regulations when symptoms meet the following criteria: (1) 
temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit or greater which is accompanied by one or more of the following: rash, 
jaundice, or glandular swelling, or which has persisted for two days or more, and (2) diarrhea severe enough to interfere 
with normal activity or work. Ibid. 
121 Through an interagency agreement between the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Division of Immigration Health Services (DIHS) provides healthcare to undocumented 
migrants in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) residing in Service Processing Centers (SPC) 
and Contract Detention Facilities (CDF). DIHS, however, plays virtually no role in regard to inspection of travelers or 
screening of legal immigrants and nonimmigrants. For more information on DIHS, see archived CRS Report RL34556, 
Health Care for Noncitizens in Immigration Detention, by Alison Siskin. 
122 The Airports are: John F Kennedy Airport in New York, Dulles outside of Washington D.C., Newark N.J., Chicago 
O’Hare Airport, and Hartsfield in Atlanta. The new screening procedures began at John F. Kennedy Airport on October 
13, 2014, and were implemented at the other four airports on October 16, 2014. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and Department of Homeland Security Office of Public Affairs, “Enhanced Ebola Screening to Start at Five 
U.S. Airports for All People Entering U.S. for Ebola-Affected Countries,” press release, October 8, 2014. 
123 The requirement to enter through one of the five airports began on October 22, 2014. Department of Homeland 
Security, “Statement by Secretary Johnson on Travel Restrictions and Protective Measures to Prevent the Spread of 
Ebola to the United States,” press release, October 21, 2014. 
124 State and local authorities will require travelers to report the following information twice daily: their temperature 
and the presence or absence of other Ebola symptoms such as headache, joint and muscle aches, weakness, diarrhea, 
vomiting, stomach pain, lack of appetite, or abnormal bleeding; and their intent to travel in-state or out-of-state. If the 
traveler does not report in, state or local public health officials will take immediate steps to locate the individual. In the 
six states (New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey, and Georgia), where approximately 70% of 
incoming travelers are headed, monitoring began on Monday, October 27, 2014. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, “CDC Announces Active Post-Arrival Monitoring for Travelers from Impacted Countries,” press release, 
October 22, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p1022-post-arrival-monitoring.html. 
125 Alison Siskin, Specialist in Immigration Policy, authored this segment. 
Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry 
 
Congressional Research Service 31 
Entry-Exit System: Issues for Congress  
The completion of a more comprehensive entry-exit system has been a persistent subject of 
congressional concern. As discussed elsewhere, two limitations of the current system are that 
most people entering the United States by land POEs only provide biographic data (i.e., do not 
provide biometric data), and that DHS may not have a fully reliable system for overstay analysis 
(see “Entry-Exit System: Implementation”). DHS reportedly has made progress with respect to 
real-time overstay analysis, but did not publish estimated overstay rates that had been expected in 
2013.126 In addition, even when DHS identifies potential visa overstayers in its dataset, the 
department has limited ability to track down and remove such overstayers.127 
Arguably, the biggest questions about the entry-exit system concern the collection of exit data. No 
exit data are collected from persons leaving through southern border land ports; and data 
collection at other ports is limited to biographic data, is not always based on machine-readable 
data, and relies on information sharing with Canada and with air and sea carriers. DHS reportedly 
believes that the biographic information sharing generally meets its needs for purposes of exit 
tracking at an acceptable cost,128 and CBP has indicated, for purposes of immigration screening, 
that “[w]hile biometric information is growing in importance, the vast majority of data available 
for use at the POEs is biographical.”129 At the same time, DHS has also argued that strengthening 
biographic data collection is a necessary precursor to biometric data collection, and views a 
biographic system as a desirable long-term goal for the entry-exit system.130 Members of 
Congress concerned with exit tracking may focus on the following questions: 
• Are biographic data adequate for entry-exit tracking, or should biometric exit 
data collection be viewed as a priority? 
• If biographic data are adequate, would an upgrade to machine-readable 
biographic data represent an improvement over the status quo? 
• Is information-sharing using data provided by airlines and by Canada an 
acceptable model for exit data, of should DHS collect exit data directly? 
• If information-sharing is acceptable, can a similar model be implemented on the 
U.S.-Mexico border, or does the Southern border require a different approach?  
• If information-sharing is not acceptable, what additional infrastructure and 
personnel are required (and at what cost) for CBP to collect universal exit data? 
                                                 
126 Napolitano testimony, 2013. 
127 ICE’s main program to apprehend at-large removable aliens in the United States is the National Fugitive Operations 
Program (NFOP), which mainly focuses on at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens, including but not limited to 
high-priority visa overstayers. The NFOP consisted of 129 fugitive operations teams as of July 2013, and was 
responsible for 37,371 arrests in FY2012. See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs 
Targeting Criminal Aliens. 
128 Heyman Testimony, 2013. 
129 CBP, Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan, CBP, Washington, DC, 
2009, p. 15. 
130 See for example Testimony of CBP Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Wagner, U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security, Border Security Oversight, 
Part III: Border Crossing Cards and B1/B2 Visas, 113th Cong., 1st sess., November 14, 2013.  
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Several bills in the 113th Congress include provisions related to exit data collection. The Border 
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), for example, 
would require carriers to collect electronic machine-readable biographic data from departing air 
passengers, and would make the implementation of this system one of the “triggers” for the 
complete implementation of the bill’s legalization provisions for certain unauthorized immigrants. 
The bill would require DHS, within two years of enactment, to establish a biometric exit system 
at the ten U.S. airports with the greatest volume of international air travel.131 S. 744 also would 
require DHS to place 90% of aliens identified as visa overstays in removal proceedings or to 
otherwise resolve their cases, though the bill would not direct new funding or programs to follow-
up such cases.132 The Border Security Results Act of 2013 (H.R. 1417), as reported by the House 
Homeland Security Committee, would require DHS, within 180 days, to submit a plan to 
Congress either to immediately complete a biometric entry-exit system, or to implement an 
alternative program within two years.133 And the Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (H.R. 
2278), as ordered reported by the House Judiciary Committee, would require the complete 
implementation of the biometric entry-exit system at all POEs within two years. 
Illegal Migration through Ports of Entry 
Discussions of immigration control and border security often focus on unauthorized flows 
between ports of entry; but unauthorized immigrants also enter through ports of entry, either 
illegally or by overstaying a nonimmigrant visa. Visa overstayers enter legally on temporary 
(nonimmigrant) visas but fail to depart before the visa expires. Unauthorized immigrants enter 
through ports of entry by using fraudulent documents (including counterfeit or altered documents, 
and legitimate documents that do not belong to them) or by evading inspection, for example by 
being hidden inside a vehicle.  
A potentially important question for Congress, particularly in light of the ongoing debate about 
immigration reform, is how much unauthorized immigration occurs through POEs? A 2006 study 
estimated that 40-50% of unauthorized immigrants in the country at the time were visa 
overstayers, and this study remains the most recent reliable public estimate.134 In addition, 
interviews conducted with current and former unauthorized migrants in 2009 found that one out 
of four illegal entrants from Mexico had entered illegally through a port, either hidden in a 
vehicle or using borrowed or fraudulent documents, and that aliens attempting illegal entry 
through a POE were half as likely to be apprehended as those crossing between the ports.135 
DHS has not published an estimate of the total number of visa overstayers in the United States or 
of the rate of illegal immigration through POEs, though the department reportedly plans to report 
                                                 
131 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major 
Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744. 
132 S. 744 §1201. 
133 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43320, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 113th Congress. 
134 Pew Hispanic Center, “Fact Sheet: Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population,” Pew Hispanic Center, 
Washington, DC, May 22, 2006. Also see CRS Report RS22446, Nonimmigrant Overstays: Brief Synthesis of the Issue. 
135 Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen, and Jorge Narvaez, “Double Jeopardy: How U.S. Enforcement Policies Shape 
Tunkaseño Migration,” in Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, David 
FitzGerald, Pedro Lewin Fischer, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San Diego Center 
for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2010), pp-60-61 and CRS communication with the authors. 
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on visa overstayers, as noted elsewhere.136 The department reportedly does not have plans to 
produce an estimate of illegal flows through POEs, and the COMPEX program is not currently 
designed to produce such an estimate (see “Random Compliance Examination (COMPEX) 
Program”). The program likely could be modified—primarily by increasing sample size—to 
produce such an estimate if Congress viewed such modifications as a priority, though CBP 
reportedly does not support such a change.137  
Recent border security bills have targeted a greater share of resources to enforcement between 
ports of entry than to inspections and enforcement at POEs (see “Port of Entry Infrastructure and 
Personnel”). Some legislation in the 113th Congress focused on enforcement between the ports. 
For example, S. 744 would require DHS to develop a strategy to achieve “effective control” of 
Border Patrol sectors between ports of entry, but does not establish goals or metrics for 
enforcement at the ports. On the other hand, the Border Security Results Act of 2013 (H.R. 1417), 
as reported by the House Homeland Security Committee, would establish POE enforcement 
metrics, though it would not authorize new enforcement measures.  
Port of Entry Infrastructure and Personnel 
One potential strategy for speeding migration flows while also enhancing border security is to add 
POE personnel and infrastructure. For any given volume of incoming travelers, both the flow rate 
(or “service level”) and the time spent on inspections are a positive function of the number of 
CBP officers on duty and the number of active travel lanes.138 Conversely, according to a 2008 
GAO report, infrastructure weaknesses increased the risk that vehicles could enter the United 
States without inspection; and staffing shortages contributed to morale problems, fatigue, lack of 
backup support, and safety issues, “increasing the potential that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, 
and illicit good could enter the country.”139 GAO revisited these concerns in 2011 and reported 
that DHS was taking steps to address GAO’s recommendations regarding staffing and 
infrastructure, but that CBP faced challenges in developing POE performance metrics.140 CBP’s 
Workload staffing model identifies a need for 3,811 additional CBP officers at POEs in 
FY2014,141 and the Administration’s FY2014 budget proposal included a request for 3,477 
additional officers.142 
                                                 
136 Napolitano testimony, 2013. 
137 According to CBP Office of Congressional Affairs (communication with CRS, December 30, 2013), CBP believes 
that developing a reliable estimate of unauthorized inflows at POEs would require substantially increasing the 
COMPEX sample size and would have a direct negative impact on secondary delays and wait times. The department 
told CRS that the necessary expansion in officer time, training costs, and technology devoted to COMPEX inspections 
would be cost and time prohibitive at many busy ports, and would be counterproductive to the mission of the agency. 
138 A similar argument can be made about the relationship among POE infrastructure and personnel, trade facilitation, 
and security; see CRS Report R43014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and 
Security. The benefits of adding infrastructure and personnel may be greatest when such increases coincide, in order to 
maintain an effective ratio of agents per lane. 
139 GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nations Ports of Entry, 
GAO-08-329T, January 3, 2008, pp. 7-9. 
140 GAO, Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders, GAO-
11-508T, March 30, 2011, pp. 5-6. 
141 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, January 8, 2014. 
142 DHS, CBP Salaries and Expenses Congressional Budget Justification, FY2014, p. 18. 
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To some extent, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) competes for resources with CBP’s Border 
Patrol and with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).143 The Border Patrol has 
grown about three times faster than OFO in the post-9/11 period.144 Similarly, S. 744, would 
direct CBP to more than double the number of Border Patrol agents on the southwest border, 
while only authorizing a 16% increase in OFO officers.145 Other bills in the 113th Congress would 
augment POE staffing, however.146 
Recent fiscal pressures have been a barrier to POE personnel increases. As mentioned, during the 
FY2014 budget process, the Administration proposed to hire 3,477 additional CBP officers (about 
half through increased appropriations and half through fee increases), but Congress approved a 
slower personnel growth, with half the proposed funding.147 Congress also authorized a pilot 
program in the FY2013 appropriations bill that permitted CBP to enter into public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) with certain localities and permitted the private sector to fund improvements 
in border facilities and port services, including by funding additional CBP officers and 
underwriting overtime hours.148 In its FY2014 budget, the Administration proposed expanding the 
pilot program by permitting CBP to accept donations to expand port operations. Approving the 
Administration’s request, Congress extended the pilot program in the FY2014 DHS 
appropriations bill.149 The current pilot program permits CBP to accept donations to expand port 
operations, among other things.150  
Trusted Traveler Programs: Issues for Congress  
As noted elsewhere, one of CBP’s primary tools for risk management at POEs is the use of 
trusted traveler programs, including Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI (see “Trusted Traveler 
Programs”).151 Trusted traveler programs are designed to facilitate legal flows by allowing low-
risk, known travelers to be exempted from certain screening and inspections and also to enhance 
security by allowing CBP officers to focus greater attention on higher-risk flows. The benefits of 
                                                 
143 CBP’s Office of Field Operations is responsible for enforcement at ports of entry (POEs); the Border Patrol is 
responsible for enforcement between POEs; and Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for immigration 
enforcement within the United States and for customs-related investigations. 
144 According to the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) analysis of CBP data, CBP officer staffing on the 
Southwest border increased 35% between 2004 (the first year for which data are available) and 2013, from 4,771 to 
6,444 officers. During the same period, Border Patrol personnel on the Southwest border increased 94%, from 9,506 to 
18,462 agents. For a fuller discussion, see CRS General Distribution memorandum, “Immigration Enforcement Since 
2006,” by Marc R. Rosenblum, available to congressional clients from the author. 
145 Section 1102 of S. 744 would require DHS to deploy 38,405 Border Patrol agents to the Southwest border, up from 
about 18,500 in FY2013, and would require CBP to add 3,500 OFO officers nationwide, up from about 21,800 in 
FY2013. 
146 See for example, the Putting Our Resources Toward Security (PORTS) Act (H.R. 583), the Cross-Border Trade 
Enhancement act of 2013 (H.R. 1108/S. 178), and the Emergency Port of Entry Personnel and Infrastructure Funding 
Act of 2013 (H.R. 3753/S. 1812). 
147 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations. 
148 See section 560 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, FY2013 (P.L. 113-6, Div. D). The 
FY2013 pilot program permitted five such partnerships in Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, and Miami, FL and land POEs in 
El Paso, TX and Laredo/McAllen, TX.  
149 See section 559 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 (P.L. 113-76, Div. F). 
150 Ibid. 
151 CBP also uses trusted trade programs as a risk management tool for commercial flows; see CRS Report R43014, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security. 
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trusted traveler programs should increase with scale because moving more travelers into 
expedited lanes speeds overall processing times, and fewer unknown travelers mitigates the 
“needle in the haystack” challenge of enforcement at POEs. Thus, legislation in the 113th 
Congress would promote membership in trusted trade programs.152 
Congress and CBP confront certain obstacles to expanding trusted traveler programs, however. 
One of the main incentives CBP can offer trusted travelers is to reduce the likelihood of 
secondary inspections; but doing so may encourage mala fide actors to enroll in these programs to 
game the system. In addition, at land POEs, travelers only benefit from an expedited inspections 
process if they are also able to take advantage of dedicated NEXUS or SENTRI lanes (i.e., so that 
the entire queue is subject to expedited processing). But CBP has limited capacity to add and 
extend dedicated lanes because many ports are located in urban areas with limited space for 
expansion,153 though the agency has addressed this problem, to some extent, by using “active lane 
management” systems that adjust lane assignments based on real-time demand.  
                                                 
152 See for example the Jobs Originated through Launching Travel (JOLT) Act of 2013 (H.R. 1354). 
153 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays, 
Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington, DC, 2008.  
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Appendix. Entry-Exit System Legislation  
Congress has enacted the following legislation concerning an entry-exit system:  
• Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, 
P.L. 104-208, Div. C). Section 110 required the Attorney General, within two 
years of enactment (i.e., by September 30, 1998), to develop an automated entry 
and exit control system that would collect records of alien arrivals and departures 
and allow the Attorney General through online searches to match such arrivals 
and departures and thereby identify nonimmigrant aliens who remain in the 
United States beyond the periods of their visas (i.e., visa overstayers). The bill 
also required the Attorney General to annually report to Congress on the number 
of visa overstayers and their countries of origin. 
• P.L. 105-259 and P.L. 105-277. These appropriations acts amended §110 of 
IIRIRA to extend the deadline for implementing the entry-exit system to October 
15, 1998 for airports and seaports and to March 30, 2001 for land POEs. 
• Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act 
(P.L. 106-215). The act amended IIRIRA §110 to describe the entry-exit system 
in greater detail; clarified that the system’s mandate did not impose new 
documentary requirements on travelers to the United States; and imposed new 
deadlines of December 2003 for implementation of the entry-exit system at all 
U.S. airports and seaports, December 2004 for implementation of the system as 
the 50 busiest land POEs, and December 2005 for making data from the system 
available to immigration officers at all POEs. The act also authorized the 
Attorney General to make entry-exit system data available to other law 
enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes. 
• Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (P.L. 106-396). Section 205 amended INA 
§217 to require the Attorney General (separate and apart from IIRIRA §110) to 
develop and implement a fully automated entry and exit control system to collect 
arrival and departure records for aliens traveling in and out of the United States 
under the Visa Waiver Program (also see “Visa Waiver Program”). 
• Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56). 
Section 411 encouraged the Attorney General to implement the IIRIRA entry-exit 
system “with all deliberate speed.” The act directed the Attorney General, in the 
development of the system, to focus on the utilization of biometric technology 
and tamper-resistant documents; and it required that the system interface with 
law enforcement databases to identify individuals who pose a threat to national 
security. In addition, Section 403 required the Departments of Justice and State, 
working through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to 
develop and certify a technology standard that can be used to verify the identity 
and check the backgrounds of persons applying for a U.S. visa or seeking 
admission at a POE. 
• Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001 (EBSVERA, P.L. 
107-173). Section 302 required the Attorney General and DOS to use the 
technology standard required to be developed under the PATRIOT Act at POEs 
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and at consular posts abroad; to establish an arrival and departure database; and 
to make all alien admissibility security databases interoperable. 
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA, P.L. 108-
458). Among other provisions, Section 7208 reiterated Congress’s finding that a 
biometric entry-exit system should be implemented as expeditiously as possible 
and required DHS to develop and report on a plan to accelerate the full 
implementation of such a system. The section also clarified that the entry-exit 
system shall include a requirement for the collection of biometric data for all 
categories of individuals required to provide such data, regardless of the POE. 
And it imposed a two year deadline for the development of a fully interoperable 
data system among relevant agencies within DOS, DHS, and DOJ. 
• Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act, 
P.L. 110-53). Section 711 amended INA §217 (as previously amended by P.L. 
106-396) to require DHS within one year to establish an exit system to record the 
departure of all air travelers participating in the Visa Waiver Program. 
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